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Abstract:

The Nanjing Massacre is an unmentionable World War II memory. Haunted
by such a typical traumatic memory, the victims of the Nanjing Massacre are
experiencing a social identity crisis which is subtle but should by no means
be overlooked. There is no shortage of “national humiliation” arguments
lamenting for their misfortune and raging over their servility. Yet at the same
time, there are also face-saving attempts to deliberately amplify the Chinese
people’s resistance during the Massacre. These are all modern representations
of the social identity crisis facing the victims of the Nanjing Massacre. 2017
marked the 80th anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre. Those who have
not experienced that holocaust tend to blame the victims’ lack of resistance
spirit. Fundamentally, such criticism roots in no appropriate access to the
real situation of the Nanjing Massacre and the extreme helplessness of those
victims in the face of death. The underestimation of the power of extreme
situations leads to the above fundamental attribution error. Therefore, China
must construct a shared traumatic memory to secure the most extensive
possible social identity for the victims of the Nanjing Massacre.
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Ｔ

raumatic memory refers to a physical or psychological trauma caused by
a severe emergency or catastrophe which is beyond individual bearing
capacity. Originally, the study of traumatic memory was mainly restricted to
the psychological area. In recent years, with building a community of common
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destiny becoming pervasive, people begin to
reflect traumatic memories such as war, massacre,
nuclear explosion and terrorist attack from a macroperspective of all mankind. Consequently, the
study of traumatic memory is extended from the
psychological area to the areas of culture, sociology,
history, philosophy, etc. Particularly in cultural
studies, traumatic memory has become an important
research topic to help interpret national cultural
psychology and review the development of society.
The Nanjing Massacre is an unmentionable
traumatic memory from World War II. Being a
major traumatic memory of the Chinese nation,
the Nanjing Massacre has already transcended
individual memory and has integrated into this
nation’s collective memory, which gradually forms
an indelible cultural trauma in the Chinese nation’s
collective unconsciousness. Cultural trauma tends to
be accompanied with the change of social identity.
That is to say, “cultural trauma occurs when certain
group members feel they have experienced a horrible
event, which leaves an indelible scar on their group
consciousness, develops into a permanent memory
and fundamentally and irreversibly changes future
identities” (Xu, 2008, p.276). Alongside such a
cultural trauma is the emergence of a social identity
crisis. Haunted by such a typical traumatic memory,
the victims of the Nanjing Massacre are experiencing
a social identity crisis which is subtle but should
by no means be overlooked. The fundamental
solution to this problem lies in constructing a trauma
memory of the Nanjing Massacre shared by all
mankind.

1. Modern representations of the
social identity crisis facing the
victims of the Nanjing Massacre
According to the written judgment made by
the International Military Tribunals for the Far East

against the Japanese criminals in World War II, from
mid-December 1937 to early 1938, a total of 300,000
Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed by the
Japanese army during the Nanjing Massacre. Eighty
years on, as its national strength keeps increasing,
China once again examines this part of history with
renewed interpretations of both the injuring and
the injured. Subtle changes do occur in the public
attitude towards those who died in or survived
the Massacre, indicating a subtle yet not-to-beoverlooked social identity crisis among the victims
of the Nanjing Massacre. Such a social identity crisis
is often demonstrated in a hidden and roundabout
way. Without appropriate guidance, this crisis will
surely generate a significant negative impact on
society.
When it comes to the Nanjing Massacre
narration, typical expression goes like this, “The
Nanjing Massacre is not only a misfortune, but
also a shame. That our compatriots were killed
like domestic animals mirrors the cowardliness
and numbness of the Chinese people, as well as
the cruelty and brutality of the invaders. And it is
our own cowardliness and numbness that allowed
the enemies’ brutality and their contempt for us”
(Li, 2011). Such a “national humiliation” argument,
which “laments for their misfortune and rages over
their servility,” remains pervasive and representative
for a long period of time, and is a modern
representation of the social identity crisis facing the
victims of the Nanjing Massacre. To some extent,
this argument rashly attributes the occurrence of
the Nanjing Massacre to the “cowardliness and
numbness of our people.” This bold view in fact
cannot withstand in-depth reasoning.
According to American thinker Ralph Waldo
Emerson, victims cannot be tarnished, which is in
fact not always true. Throughout human history,
putting the victims to blame is not rare. In the early
days of the State of Israel, to gain legitimacy for their
117
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newly established country, Zionists enthusiastically
advocated the courageous spirit of ancient Jews
and simply could not understand why six million
Jews on the European Continent were slaughtered
like lambs by the Nazis without any attempt of
resistance during World War II. The cowardliness
and weakness they demonstrated was regarded as
a shame of the Israelites by the Zionists. On the
other hand, the physical and psychological weakness
exhibited by those narrowly-escaped Jews seem to
have proved such a view and therefore exacerbated
society’s contempt and disgust for the survivors of
the Holocaust. For European Jews who survived the
Holocaust, their suffering became a shame, which
they could do nothing to erase. To continue their life
and adapt themselves to society as soon as possible,
many of those survivors were forced to keep silent
and even deliberately “forget” that experience. For
quite a long period of time following World War II,
European Jews who had been tortured to death were
not duly commemorated, or were even “forgotten.”
This was similar to the temporary “dreariness” of the
Nanjing Massacre memory after World War II. Thus,
it can be seen, a post-trauma social identity crisis is
not an individual case but a common phenomenon.
This is particularly true of the traumatic psychic
reaction-initiated “defense period,”① during which
evasion, denial and withdrawal are all normal
psychological reactions. It is an inevitable stage that
the traumatic subjects, including the witnesses and
the entire society, must undergo.
Apart from the abovementioned “national
shame” argument, another modern representation

of a social identity crisis facing the victims of the
Nanjing Massacre is the deliberate amplification
of their resistance. Such a representation tends to
be more complicated and covert. For a long time,
there has been a view that the Nanjing Massacre
witnessed “the coexistence of massacre and
resistance, and the contrast of shame and glory” (Sun,
2005, p.277). Admittedly, during the Massacre there
were heroic deeds, which became an important part
of the memory in Nanjing Massacre. For example,
Li Xiuying kept fighting with Japanese soldiers
after he had suffered over 30 stabs; Liang Zhicheng
refused to drive for Japanese soldiers and launched
a desperate struggle with them. Yet, overall “during
the Massacre military and civilian resistance in
Nanjing was not massive, but uncommon, dispersive
and unorganized.” Under some circumstances,
the lack of fierce mass resistance among the
Chinese soldiers and civilians in Nanjing during
the Massacre may leave the wrong impression of
“awaiting their doom” (Ma & Xing, 2007). In recent
years, with increased academic attention paid to
the Nanjing Massacre studies, there seems to be a
tendency to amplify the Chinese people’s resistance
during the Massacre. Some scholars argue that the
courageousness of the Chinese nation can only be
embodied by a mass resistance against the invaders.
Even if there was no such thing as a mass resistance
in reality, China should still amplify that resistance
so as to safeguard its national pride. Such a view
seems to recognize the worthy deaths of the Nanjing
Massacre victims but is in fact blaming them in a
disguised form. This groundless recognition, which

① According to relevant psychological studies, post-traumatic psychological process mainly comprises four stages, i.e. shock, reaction, working through and
processing, as well as reorientation. The first stage “shock” comes right after the occurrence of a crisis, when the traumatic subject feels shocked and panic,
and does not know what to do. The second stage is reaction (defense and withdrawal), i.e. the traumatic subject’s irrational use of means such as denial,
withdrawal or evasion to cope with severe trauma beyond their bearing capacity and recover peace of mind as soon as possible. Such means, however, can
deliver nothing but negative impact. The third stage, namely, working through and processing, involves active application of various methods to solve the
problem, boost confidence and resume social functions. Post-traumatic psychological process ends with the fourth stage–reorientation, in which those who
have survived a crisis may grow more mature both in mind and in behavior and develop a more positive attitude towards life; or may become negative and even
suffer multiple mental disorders.
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The Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders

is against objective fact, is a representation of an
even more profound identity crisis. It is no different
from people’s stress responses (dodge, denial,
withdrawal, etc.) to trauma and is an improper
projection of national pride, which is echoed to
the extreme by the emergence of “ridiculous antiJapanese aggression dramas.”
This newly emerged TV series genre has
been popular over the past years and completely
turned the established objective cognition of the
“anti-Japanese aggression memory” upside down.
Ignoring historical facts, such “ridiculous antiJapanese aggression dramas” have significantly
downplayed the toughness, duration and cruelty
of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against
Japanese Aggression and absurdly represented

their 14-year-long resistance in the form of “tearing
Japanese soldiers apart with bare hands.” To the
surprise of many people, these “ridiculous antiJapanese aggression dramas,” however sensational
and distorted they may be, enjoy fairly high ratings.
While criticizing their distortion of history, the
public shows great tolerance to this TV genre. This
seemingly self-contradicting attitude is facilitated
by the current “entertainment first” atmosphere
and rooted in the fact that such dramas cater to the
Chinese people’s wishes to get rid themselves of
the stigma brought about by the war trauma and
to rebuild national pride and confidence. Different
from a victory-related memory, traumatic memory
can impair collective identity, national pride and a
sense of belonging. Given this, the more people feel
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close to a traumatic memory, the more they tend to
keep away from it and reconstruct the past by means
of denial and dodging. This is a typical mechanism
of psychological defense and self-protection. The
increasingly strong denial and dodging highlights
the severe social traumatic crisis that the subject
suffers and a pressing need to construct a new social
identity.

2. Root cause and consequences of
the social identity crisis facing the
victims of the Nanjing Massacre
The social identity crisis facing the victims
of the Nanjing Massacre is the outcome of social
development. Exploring its root cause is of great
significance for the correct understanding of the
traumatic memory of the Nanjing Massacre and the
reconstruction of the victims’ social identity.
From the representation of the social identity
crisis facing the victims of the Nanjing Massacre,
it is not difficult to discover that all blame revolves
around one point: Why there was no mass military
and civilian resistance against the Japanese army
during the Massacre?
It has been 80 years since the Nanjing Massacre
and there are not many survivors and witnesses
still alive today. For those who did not experience
that catastrophe, their doubts root in no appropriate
access to the real situation of the Nanjing Massacre
and the extreme helplessness of those victims in the
face of death. Their underestimation of the power of
the situation in extreme cases leads to a fundamental
attribution error.
Regarding the real situation of the Nanjing
Massacre and the extreme helplessness of the
victims in the face of the Massacre, there are a
large number of detailed records kept by Chinese
and Japanese organizations, as well as other thirdparty organizations. Among those depictions is
120

the recall of the Massacre survivor Cao Qilan,
who lived at Pukou, Nanjing. Looking back at the
Japanese army’s atrocity over 60 years ago, Cao still
felt terrified and helpless. “I was so scared of the
Japanese soldiers that I dared not cry when seeing
my second oldest brother killed. It is such a painful
memory. How I wish to kill those Japanese soldiers.
Deep inside, I have always hated the Japanese, yet at
the same time I have been so scared of them. There
is simply no way out” (Zhang, 2006, p.273).
On December 13, 1937, Nakajima Kesago,
regimental commander of the Japanese army’s 16th
division, wrote in his diary, “We basically ignored
the captive policy and decided to wipe out all
captives. Given that they were captured in groups
of one thousand, five thousand or even ten thousand
soldiers, we cannot immediately disarm them all.
Even so, they have completely lost their will to fight
and just numbly came in groups, forming no threat
to us at all” (The Editorial Committee of the Nanjing
War History, 1993, p.220). A similar account was
also given by the Japanese soldier Osawa Kazuo,
who then served in the second troop of the 33rd
regiment of the infantry. He recalled, “The city gate
was wide open, inside which there were a large
number of remnant soldiers. Perhaps because of such
a hopeless situation, they successively raised their
arms in surrender─We fetched barrels of gasoline
and poured it down onto them from the city gate
tower. Those Chinese seemed to have given up hope,
standing there still. When they were on fire, some
of them did make a futile attempt to escape, only to
find them in smoke without fierce struggle”.
In addition to the historical data kept by the
Chinese and Japanese, there were also countless
diaries and letters written by Westerners then living
in Nanjing depicting the extreme helplessness of the
disarmed Chinese soldiers. On December 15, 1937,
John Heinrich Detlef Rabe, a German businessman
and president of the International Committee for
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the Nanjing Safety Zone, wrote a letter to Fukuda
Tokuyasu, then diplomat at the Japanese Embassy
in China, asking Japan to adhere to the principle of
humanitarianism and be kind to Chinese captives.
In his letter, Rabe depicted how helpless those
nowhere-to-hide Chinese soldiers were in the city
of Nanjing, “The International Committee for
the Nanjing Safety Zone is deeply shocked by the
misery of those already disarmed Chinese soldiers.
Right from the very beginning, the Committee has
worked hard to ensure no Chinese soldier was in the
Safety Zone. Until the afternoon of December 13
everything had worked as planned. However, during
that very afternoon, a few hundred Chinese soldiers
approached and eventually entered the Safety Zone.
They pleaded with us for help out of despair” (John
Heinrich Detlef Rabe, 1997, p.180).
Judging from the abovementioned historical
data, the despair and helplessness of the Chinese
soldiers and civilians was beyond verbal description.
Under such extremely desperate circumstances, the
soldiers guarding the city “completely lost the will to
fight” and “gave up hope, standing there still.” With
their enemies much better equipped and trained,
the Chinese army could not compete with them on
the battlefield, let alone after being captured. It is
from such a strong sense of powerlessness that they
“learned” helplessness. Learned helplessness refers
to the instinctive reaction of humans and animals
that have experienced adverse events beyond their
control (Myers, 2016, p.58). As proved by Martin
Seligman’s famous experiment①, in which caged
dogs lost the courage to resist when realizing they

could never avoid the electric shock no matter
how hard they tried. The result of this experiment
indicates that be it human or animal, extreme
circumstance can deprive one of the courage to
resist, which is understandable and therefore should
not be blamed. Some may argue that learned
helplessness can be overcome through individual
efforts and that the Nanjing Massacre victims’
failure to start a mass resistance exposed their weak
will. There is no denial that learned helplessness
in daily life can be overcome through “systematic
management” of personal control. However, this
capacity must be based on individuals’ certain rights
to control and choose. Evidently, this does not apply
to the victims under extreme circumstances such as
war and massacre.
Excessive blame on the victims of the Nanjing
Massacre for their lack of resistance highlights
people’s fundamental attribution error, which is due
to their underestimation of the power of a situation
in extreme cases. Culture may form the most
significant force that influences human behavior at
the macro level, while social situations are arguably
among the major factors that manipulate it at the
micro level. In each social situation and under the
restriction of a social norm, people unconsciously
develop a conformist mentality and tend to be more
obedient to authoritative and mandatory discourse.
A social situation may turn ordinary people into
slaughterers, as well as reward virtue and punish
vice. Given that, when analyzing and interpreting
a social phenomenon or a human behavior, one
must sensibly take the power of the social situation

① American psychologist Seligman conducted serial experiments with dogs. Experiment 1: He put a dog into a cage equipped with electric-shock device and
then discovered that when the dog was shocked, it struggled desperately to escape from the cage. After repeated failures, however, its struggle gradually scaled
down. Experiment 2: He put that dog, which had just been electrically shocked into a cage with half area electrified and the other half not, and then discovered
that the dog passively endured electric shock in despair without any attempt to escape. Experiment 3: He put some dogs, which had no prior experience of
electric shock into the second cage and discovered that all of them could easily escape from the electrified side to the other safe side. Seligman named the
desperate mentality of the first dog “learned helplessness,”which in fact also applies to humans. According to Seligman, to avoid “learned helplessness,” a
dog needs to be taught how to avoid being electrically shocked before it is taken in that“unavoidable electric shock” experiment. Thus, dogs were put into the
second cage (with half area electrically neutral) to learn how to escape from electric shock. Having learnt such a skill, they were taken in the first experiment.
The result proved that those dogs were less likely to acquire “learned helplessness.”
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into consideration, and avoid any exaggeration,
underestimation or neglect of it.
Regarding the explanation of individual human
behavior, there are two patterns of attribution, i.e.
internal attribution (personality attribution) and
external attribution (situation attribution). Also, the
process of attribution is usually accompanied with
self-serving bias. Human analysis is a process of
self-serving attribution to maximize self-interests.
More specifically, people tend to attribute their
positive results such as success and honor to internal
factor, i.e. their own excellent qualities, and attribute
their negative results, such as failure and setback to
external factor, i.e. the objective condition. Given
that objective condition is beyond their control, they
can avoid personal responsibility for those negative
results. When it comes to negative results delivered
by others, however, people adopt an entirely different
pattern of attribution. Related research findings
indicate that the “observers,” well aware of others’
suffering and their futility to offer significant help,
tend to disapprove or even belittle the sufferers and
attribute their tragedy to internal factors, i.e. their
own fault. This is based on a so-called “just world”
hypothesis, which is the assumption that a person’s
actions are inherently inclined to “bring morally fair
and fitting consequences to that person,” to the end
of all noble actions being eventually rewarded and
all evil actions eventually punished. For example,
according to this hypothesis, poverty must result
from laziness and idleness; the suffering of territorial
invasion or massacre can only happen to a people
who are inherently cowardly and incompetent.
There is a tendency to think that “China’s being
invaded and torn apart was mainly attributed to
itself and its people. The link is robust and cannot
be relieved, even a little bit, no matter what excuses
there may be. It is the Chinese people themselves
that could save them from sufferings, make them
stronger, give them dignity and lead the country
122

revive again” (Jin, 1995). The age of peace we
are now in sees our faith in a “just world” being
intensified as we take pride in the prosperity of
our country, for we believe that we have earned
all the things through diligence and wisdom and
deserve what we have. The “just world” assumption,
however, also holds that China was invaded and its
people were slaughtered only because they “asked
for” and “deserved” it by not being strong but
instead being numb and cowardly. This logic of a
“just world,” quite similar to the law of the jungle
namely “the weak are meat; the strong do eat,”
deserves credit for prompting a nation or a country’s
sense of crisis and helping to build a national spirit of
always striving for greatness. However, the so-called
“just world” hypothesis drastically underestimates
the uncontrollable factors of the society by not fully
acknowledging the ferocity of the Japanese army in
the Nanjing Massacre, nor truly understanding how
hopeless and helpless the victims felt when being
killed. That either directly or indirectly leads to the
attribution error of the Nanjing Massacre, as well as
a social identity crisis facing the victims.
All histories are contemporary, for human
interpretation of past occurrences is all based on
contemporary values, attitudes towards history and
cognitive standards. All the memories there are
shaped by judgment here, being past behaviors that
are reconstructed by attitudes at present. The image
of victims of the Nanjing Massacre, as a reminder
of this most typical traumatic memory, somehow
does not match up with the hard-working, brave,
undaunted and always-striving-for-greatness national
spirit that China is currently making efforts to build
and advocate. Naturally the need to maintain the
national dignity and enhance national confidence
might lead to spontaneous attempts to reconstruct
this painful memory, to overstate the defying acts
of Chinese civilians and soldiers and to try to ease
the pain by making things a bit brighter. That easily
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explains why there are so many “ridiculous antiJapanese aggression dramas” occupying the TV
screen these days.
In a manner of speaking, reconstruction of a
historical or even a cultural memory is not rare in
human history, and is well justified, for it serves as
a most effective way to prove the legitimacy of the
subject and win it the widest possible social identity.
It is true that this kind of reconstruction is helpful for
the formation of good values and attitudes towards
history, but in the case of the Nanjing Massacre, it is
not a good choice, for despite its role in maintaining
national dignity and confidence, it will blur the focus
of history, reduce the warning effect of the Nanjing
Massacre on human’s life and peaceful development,
and strengthen the social identity crisis the victims
are suffering.

3. Social identity and public
construction in the historical
recognition of the Nanjing
Massacre
To reconstruct the social identity of the victims
is a crucial task for education on the history of
the Nanjing Massacre. There is a strong sense of
alienation that exists when the modern symptoms
and the causes of the social identity crisis facing the
Nanjing Massacre victims are studied. People both
experience and observe this historical disaster; they
are both “victims” that suffer so much and “judges”
that claim the moral. The arbitrary alternation
between the two roles, on the one hand, projects
anxiety and helplessness brought by a traumatic
memory, and on the other hand implies that the social
identity and public construction in the historical
recognition of the Nanjing Massacre must proceed
from two perspectives: victims and onlookers.
Using the victim identity to gain social identity
must avoid or overcome two mindsets: an excessive

sense of shame and a victim mentality.
The sense of shame is an emotional experience
that occurs when a person feels his behavior
is inappropriate and attributes the negative
consequence to his own lack of abilities. A moderate
sense of shame proves helpful for the self-formation
of morality, prompting individuals to adjust to
universal moral standards and regulate their acts.
However, too great a sense of shame means disaster.
Social psychologists note that a sense of shame is
the most negative emotion that invariably invites
self-depreciation. The sense of shame cuts short
all positive emotions like joy and enterprise and
replaces them with negative emotions like retreating
and restraining. Worse still, the sense of shame is
insidious, accumulative and chronic. Moderate, it
would be normal psychological reaction; too intense,
or even affecting self-evaluation, it would lead to too
much self-criticism and anger or even assault on the
world and other people.
Some studies show that “As time goes on, the
Nanjing citizens, in their memory of the Nanjing
Massacre, are transcending their original inclination
towards revenge, which has given way to a sort
of self-accusation and sense of self-dependence
spurred by the faith that ‘Lagging behind leaves
one vulnerable to attacks’”(Zhang, 2003). “Being
brave after feeling ashamed” is good news, but overinterpretation of the sense of shame because of the
Nanjing Massacre might burden the victims with
so much emotional pressure that it could possibly
result in negative, revengeful emotions, which
are sure to threaten social stability and hamper
peaceful development of society. In fact, there is
nothing terrible about the sense of shame. It is how
people face up to it that matters. Freedom from it
requires self-understanding, self-forgiveness and
self-encouragement based on an objective historical
understanding. It is impossible for people to be
proud of their painful experiences, but it might
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be healthy if they could view those experiences
as a challenging test for the Chinese nation on its
path to growth. What’s worthy of pride is that, it
is those very painful experiences that have taught
the Chinese to fight their way out of darkness and
let them know that only through relentless striving
could they achieve the great rejuvenation.
Social identity is a process of categorization.
When it comes to self-categorization people today,
who have never experienced a devastating disaster
firsthand might prefer to define themselves as
victims of the Nanjing Massacre in broad terms,
namely “the injured party,” and review or comment
on the painful history through the lens of “an
injured party.” The identity, whether of the victims
or survivors, was an “injured party” of the Nanjing
Massacre. This has been widely recognized by
the international community, and can never be
doubted either in objective or subjective terms.
However, the injured of the Nanjing Massacre must
try to avoid assuming a “victim mentality,” which
is an unhealthy psychological state in which one
spontaneously regards himself or herself as the
victim, and a self-defense mechanism that one takes
in the face of a social identity crisis to shake off
the sense of shame and responsibility. There are no
necessary links between the “victim mentality” and
the “victim” though. Some victims might deal with
wounds with a positive attitude and never develop a
“victim mentality,” while others, even if they are not
actual victims, could end up intentionally defining
themselves as victims during the self-categorization
process and finally make that tendency a personal
trait. Therefore the “victim mentality” is, to a large
extent, a choice made by people themselves. Those
with such a mentality are often characterized by
negative attributes, such as lack of introspection,
excessive defense and being too revengeful. They
stubbornly believe they are the real victims, claim
the moral, always ask for sympathy and help, and
124

even distort history by taking advantage of their
identity as a victim, for example, a typical “victim
mentality” has been haunting Japan after World War
II, which, as the only country that had ever gone
through a nuclear attack, always stresses its identity
as a victim of nuclear weapons but recoils from its
responsibility for the invasive wars it had waged.
Its unwise attitude towards history has sparked
wide criticism and outcry from its neighbors who
have been hurt by the Japanese invasions. There is
a revengeful emotion brooding among the people
of the victim countries, and even revengeful voices
permeating the Internet. Therefore, the unhealthy
“victim mentality” not only cuts sympathy and
recognition from the outside, but creates new social
identity crises, which will then formulate vicious
circles where bad things reinforce each other, and
terribly threaten regional peace and stability.
As time goes by, when the Nanjing Massacre is
reviewed, it might be more natural for the younger
generation who have never experienced the horrors
of war to take a perspective that is close to an
observer or a judge, while in fact it is not easy for
people to completely abstain from the feeling like a
victim. Recognized or not, the traumatic memory
has long merged into our blood and national
unconsciousness, and has become an inseparable
part of the Chinese memory of its history. Whether
for the victims or the observers of the Nanjing
Massacre, it is necessary to reconstruct a shared
traumatic memory, if the social identity of the
victims is to be renewed.
“Social identity is in nature a collective
thinking” (Li, 2007). Its process consists of group
categorization, individual categorization and social
comparison. The old social identity system has
been broken by a traumatic memory, and to build
a new one must count on the public reconstruction
of the traumatic memory. In the case of the Nanjing
Massacre, the traumatic memory must be built into
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a memory shared by all nations and even all human
beings so that it could gain the widest possible social
identity.
Education on history or attitudes towards history
is an effective way to construct a shared traumatic
memory. In the case of the Nanjing Massacre, there
are three stages.
First, personalize the victims so as to win more
emotional support. Today’s doubts about the Nanjing
Massacre victims are largely attributed to the huge
gap of time and space, and a lack of education
regarding the massacre, which estranges people
from the victims. When it comes to the victims,
most would only think of the number of deaths, a
dull image, and a rigid concept that can hardly raise
empathy. Only by personalizing those victims can
they gain wider concern and sympathy, for example,
The Diary of Anne Frank, which serves as a private
testimony to the killings of the Jews by the Nazis,
has won the Jewish victims worldwide sympathy
and respect. It reveals the critical role personalization
plays to bring people emotionally closer to victims.
Only by making people feel the same way as the
victims can the painful history be jointly borne and
a traumatic memory shared by all human beings be
created.
Second, the historical education on the Nanjing
Massacre must shift its attention from humanity
during the disaster to post-disaster humanity.
Previous education always focus on how people
behaved during the massacre and explores the pitiful
state of the victims and the cruelty of the butchers,
namely the state of the people involved during the
disaster. Though education aims to understand
history objectively and comprehensively, it is
far from enough for the construction of a shared
traumatic memory. The observer of the disaster,
without a time machine, must, while never forgetting
the disaster, transcend its national feelings as a
victim, focus on the future, place itself in the shared

human destiny, and, with the goal of peace and
development in mind, consider how people should
interact with each other after the disaster. That
would be a crucial step for the humanity during the
disaster to evolve into post-disaster humanity.
Third, decontextualize the traumatic memory
of the Chinese in the Nanjing Massacre education,
and extend it to something owned by all mankind.
Jeffrey Charles Alexander, a US cultural sociologist,
once pointed out that the construction of traumatic
memory matters for social identity in that “through
the construction of a cultural trauma, all social
communities, countries, societies, and even the
whole civilization, will not only identify the very
existence and source of human woes, but also will
undertake some major responsibilities. Once the
cause of the sufferings is identified and due moral
responsibility is assumed, unity is established among
the members of the group, which is supposed to
make people share others’ pain.” A national trauma,
once decontextualized, can reach people beyond
ethnic or national borders, and with the scope of
the injured being enlarged, evolve into the painful
destiny shared by all, thereby making itself a cultural
trauma shared by all human beings, and gaining
wider and deeper social identity.
In 2015, the Nanjing Massacre documents
were archived in UNESCO's Memory of the World
Register, marking a crucial step for the Nanjing
Massacre to evolve from a national memory to a
mankind memory. However, in comparison with the
killings of Jews by the Nazis, the Nanjing Massacre
is less known around the world. It has a long way
to go before it becomes a real traumatic memory
shared by the whole world. And only then can it get
the widest social identity.
The call to construct a shared traumatic
memory and gain wide social identity reflects
deeper cognition and more in-depth understanding
about the Nanjing Massacre, which rightly echoes
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the trend of opposing wars and safeguarding peace
around the world today. As the concept of building a
community of common destiny is getting popular, to
build a peaceful world that sees no wars has become
a beautiful vision held by people all over the world.
History is always worth learning from and all the
past wars and atrocities must be seriously examined.
Always remembering history and never forgetting

the historical tragedies is helpful for people to draw
lessons and avoid similar disasters in the future. In
that sense, the construction of a shared traumatic
memory of the Nanjing Massacre and gaining social
identity for the victims is far more meaningful for
this age and reality than it seems.
(Translator: Wu Lingwei, Xu Qingtong;
Editor: Yan Yuting)

This paper has been translated and reprinted with the permission of Jianghai Academic Journal, No.5,
2017.
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